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Bypassing the Chain of 
Command
The p olitica l origins o f the RCN’s 
equipm ent crisis of 1943
Richard Oliver Mayne
At the  behest of A ngus L. M acdonald, the M in iste r of N ationa l D efence for Naval 
Services, J o h n  Jo sep h  Connolly conducted  a 
secre t investigation in October 1943 into the 
s ta te  of eq u ip m en t on C an ad ian  w arsh ip s . 
C onnolly , w ho w as M acd o n a ld ’s execu tive 
a ss is ta n t, traveled to St. J o h n ’s, Londonderry 
an d  London where he discovered th a t the Royal 
C anad ian  Navy (RCN) w as far beh ind  its allies 
in the m odernization of its escort fleet. Canadian 
sh ip s lacked gyroscopic com passes, hedgehog, 
effective ra d a r  a n d  asd ic , a s  well a s  o th er 
technical gear th a t w as essential in the Battle of 
the Atlantic. These deficiencies should  not have 
come as a su rp rise . Inadequate  equ ipm ent on 
RCN sh ip s h ad  already becom e obvious during  
the intense convoy battles of 1941, and had  been 
c o n firm e d  y e t a g a in  by  th o s e  of 1 9 4 2 .1 
Insufficient tra in ing  and  m anning  policies also 
played their p a rt  in  C anad ian  problem s a t sea. 
However, it w as to be the technical aspects th a t 
M a c d o n a ld  fo c u s e d  u p o n  o n ce  C o n n o lly  
re tu rn ed  from overseas, leading no t only to a 
d isruptive feud w ith the naval staff, b u t also, in 
the ir way, to the eventual rep lacem ent of Vice 
Admiral Percy W. Nelles as the Chief of the Naval 
S taff (CNS) in J a n u a ry  1944.2
Over the p a s t 30 years various h isto rian s 
have successfully described the RCN’s technical 
difficulties from an  operational perspective, b u t 
due to the unavailability  of som e key sources 
th e  o rig in s  a n d  im p o rta n c e  of C onno lly ’s 
investigation have not been fully analyzed. Most 
accounts explain how a group of perm anent force 
officers, including  C ap ta in  J.M . Row land (a
B ritish  officer on loan to the  RCN), L ieu tenan t 
Com m ander Desm ond Piers, and C aptain R.E.S. 
Bidwell, wrote in d ep en d en t m em os to Naval 
Service H eadquarte rs  (NSHQ) betw een 1 May 
a n d  22 J u n e  1943, voicing their concern  th a t 
poor equ ipm ent on RCN escorts w as affecting 
efficiency.3 W hile th ese  critic ism s w ere not 
ignored, NSHQ w as slow to respond  to them , 
an d  for the m ost p a rt  M acdonald w as largely 
unaw are  of the  problem . This s itu a tio n  m ight 
have persis ted  h ad  it n o t been  for L ieu tenan t 
C om m ander William Strange, Royal C anad ian  
Navy Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR). After a trip  to 
the  U nited  Kingdom, S trange, the  A ssistan t 
D irec to r of Naval In form ation , su b m itte d  a 
report directly to Connolly in A ugust 1943 in 
w hich he recorded th a t  certain  B ritish  officers 
and  their C anadian  subord inates overseas were 
extrem ely concerned abou t the RCN’s technical 
problems. The standard  historical interpretation 
is  t h a t  M a cd o n a ld , w a ry  of th e  p o lit ic a l 
im p l ic a t io n s ,  th e n  o rd e re d  C o n n o lly  to 
investigate these  charges. While there  is m uch  
validity  to th is  in te rp re ta tio n , new  evidence 
m ak es it n e c essa ry  n o t only to re-eva lua te  
S trange’s role, b u t also the im pact th a t a group 
of in fluential reserve officers (often u n d e r the 
d irection of RN au thorities) had  in bringing the 
s t a t e  of e q u ip m e n t  o n  RCN e s c o r t s  to  
M acdonald’s a tten tion . It is there , am ong the 
B ritish  and  RCNVR officer overseas, th a t  the 
political origins of the equipm ent crisis can  be 
traced.
L ieu tenan t C om m ander D. P iers’s report in 
J u n e  1943  h a d  a c tu a lly  s ta t e d  t h a t  h is
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observations spoke not only for perm anen t force 
officers, “b u t also those experienced Reserve 
Officers who now com m and the vast m ajority of 
HMC s h ip s  a n d  w ho a re  d iff id e n t a b o u t  
forwarding their opinions to NSHQ.”4 Piers was 
correct in observing th a t m any RCNVR officers5 
did no t raise  the ir concerns w ith equipm ent to 
NSHQ. Instead, it appears th a t some were willing 
to bypass the chain of com m and and  voice their 
opinions directly to Connolly and  M acdonald. 
There were m em bers of the naval staff who were 
aware th a t various seagoing officers were taking 
th e ir  c o n c e rn s  d irec tly  to  M acdonald . For 
example, after the w ar one form er staff m em ber 
reported tha t,
.. .most of the trouble appeared to me that our 
[reserve] officers would come back, somewhat 
naturally , com plaining abou t their lack of 
modern equipment and that they were very open 
about this. They use to go see the Minister behind 
Nelles’ back, and that sort of thing, and say that 
we hadn’t got certain equipment.6
Although the tim e period to w hich th is  officer 
refers is uncertain, there is little doubt th a t there 
were reserve officers who h a d  direct access to 
the m inister, as M acdonald h im self adm itted  
that, “[allot of the RCNVR officers who come back 
from sea  call in to see me an d  they ta lk  quite 
frankly. I always encourage them  to do th a t . .. ,”7 
Exactly who these  m ysterious inform ants were 
and w hen they saw M acdonald is uncertain , b u t 
it is possible to identify a group of officers who 
were com m unicating various problem s with the 
fleet directly to Connolly, during  the trying days 
of 1942-43.
The m ost influential individual w ith in  th is  
group w as the com m anding officer of HMCS
Jo h n  J o se p h  C onnolly crossing the  A tlan tic  
in th e  corvette HM CS  Orillia, October 1943. 
C o n n o lly , e x e c u tiv e  a s s i s ta n t  to A n g u s  
M acdonald , M in ister o jN a tio n a l D e fen ce fo r  
N a v a l  S e r v ic e s ,  p l a y e d  a  k e y  ro le  in  
exposing  the defic iencies in the C anad ian  
escort f le e t.
Am herst, L ieutenant Com m ander Louis 
Audette, RCNVR. Two other individuals 
w hom  C onnolly  w ould  also  u se  for 
in fo rm a tio n  w ere the  c o m m an d in g  
officer of HMCS Snowberry, L ieutenant 
Barry O’Brien, RCNVR, and  L ieutenant 
J im  Mitchell, RCNVR, who com m anded 
HM CS O rillia . C o n s id e r in g  t h a t  s e n io r  
perm anen t force officers such  as Rowland, Piers 
and  Bidwell were unab le  to effect change w ith 
NSHQ’s equipm ent policy, it m ay be difficult to 
u n d e rs ta n d  how these  relatively ju n io r reserve 
officers h a d  d ire c t a c c e ss  to M a cd o n a ld ’s 
execu tive  a s s is ta n t .  T his s itu a tio n  c an  be 
explained by looking a t Connolly’s life before the 
war.
Prior to becom ing a civil servant, Connolly 
once w orked for the law firm  of A udette and  
O’Brien B arris te r’s and  Solicitors in M ontreal, 
a practice th a t was co-owned by Louis A udette’s 
brother. It w as th rough  th is  firm  th a t Connolly 
f irs t m et J im  M itchell w ho w as one of h is  
colleagues. On the other hand , Audette, who was 
also a lawyer, h ad  ac tually  been  a friend since 
c h i ld h o o d .8 B a r ry  O ’B r ie n  a ls o  b e c a m e  
a c q u a in te d  w ith  C onnolly  th ro u g h  a legal 
c o n n e c tio n . In  F e b ru a ry  1933, gold m ine  
m agnate Jo h n  Ambrose O’Brien (Barry O’Brien’s 
fa ther) becam e C onnolly ’s f irs t c lien t, a n d  
subsequen tly  he rem ained  close to the  entire 
family throughout the thirties.9 Considering th a t 
Connolly w as well know n to th ese  officers it 
shou ld  hard ly  be su rp ris in g  th a t they sha red  
their tria ls  an d  tribu la tions w ith each  o ther 
th roughout the war.
Although he did not disclose the purpose  of 
h is  trip  in  O ctober 1943, C onnolly alw ays 
claim ed th a t  he  w as acting  on M acdonald’s 
in struction . In private, however, he gave credit 
for this investigation to Audette. Having returned  
from the U nited Kingdom in November 1943 
Connolly wrote to A udette w here he m ade a 
rem arkab le  adm ission: “I guess you have not 
seen Jim  Mitchell, b u t I have arrived back, after
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss3/2
L ie u te n a n t - C o m m a n d e r  L .C . A u d e t t e ,  
R C N V R , c o m m a n d in g  o f f ic e r  o f  H M C S  
Am herst. Connolly cred its A u d e tte  w ith fir s t  
provid ing  the  in form ation  th a t s ta r te d  his  
in vestiga tion .
a m ost profitable experience. Inasm uch 
as the original suggestion came from you 
over a year ago, I feel th a t  you shou ld  
get some credit.”10 Accepting th is praise 
A udette congra tu la ted  Connolly on the 
success  of h is investigation an d  then  
con tinued  th a t they shou ld  “try  to get 
b a c k  to w here we m et [alm ost] 14 
m on ths ago and  we could have su c h  a 
p leasan t ch in .”11 This correspondence 
in d ic a te s  th a t  A u d e tte  m ade  th e  o rig in a l 
suggestion  for Connolly’s investigation in  late 
October 1942. It was during th a t m onth  th a t the 
D irector of T rade, C ap ta in  Eric B rand , RN, 
accom panied Connolly to St. J o h n ’s. Officially, 
B ran d  claim ed th a t  h is  v isit w as p rim arily  
concerned  w ith Naval Control Service m atters, 
b u t in private he called it h is “fake trip  to the 
M aritim es."12 Instead, having developed a close 
professional rela tionsh ip  w ith Connolly since 
February 1942, B rand’s real purpose was to help 
show  the executive a s s is ta n t  “how the poor 
lived.” The “poor” being the sailors of the  RCN’s 
escort fleet.13
E x a c tly  w hy B ra n d  fe lt c o m p e lle d  to 
“ed u c a te ” Connolly is a m ystery. However, it 
appears  th a t o ther m em bers of the  naval staff 
h a d  ostracized B rand, who w as also the  Royal 
Navy (RN) A ttache. For example, according to 
naval h isto rian  Jo sep h  Schull, B rand  w as “a 
g rea t source of annoyance  to the  trem bling  
virtuosos of the perm anent Canadian navy... they 
resen ted  and  feared him; an d  relegated him  
carefully  to h is  own a ffa irs .”14 In p a rt, th is  
p o s s ib ly  p ro v id e s  a n  e x p la n a tio n . If h is  
colleagues would not listen to his concerns about 
the sta te  of the navy, it is conceivable th a t Brand 
felt th a t he h ad  no o ther option b u t to appeal to 
Connolly ra th e r  th a n  the officers on the naval 
staff.
Irrespective of B rand ’s motives, however, 
Connolly had  h is own reasons for travelling to 
St. J o h n ’s in late October 1942. This w as m ost 
likely the re s u lt  of a series  of rep o rts  th a t  
M acdonald h ad  received from an  em bittered  
naval reserve officer. Since July  1942, Lieutenant
C om m ander Andrew Dyas M acLean, RCNVR, 
and  a group of anonym ous reserve officers had  
p ro te s te d  d irec tly  to th e  m in is te r  th a t  the  
p e rm an en t force kep t an  unw arran ted  num ber 
of prom otions, shore postings an d  aw ards for 
them selves. A lthough som e of these  officers 
com plained ab o u t inadequate  equipm ent and 
tra in ing  on C anad ian  escort vessels, the  vast 
majority of their gripes fixated on the perception 
th a t the perm anen t force d iscrim inated against 
rese rv is ts  b ecau se  they  were seen  as “ran k  
a m a te u rs .”15 In tu rn , it w as argued  th a t  th is 
m entality was having a  detrem ental effect on the 
m orale of the RCNVR officer corps. A lthough 
Connolly was in St. Jo h n ’s to assess  the validity 
of these  charges, it w as no t long before he was 
given an  appreciation of the sta te  equipm ent on 
RCN escorts.
W hile in  S t. J o h n ’s C onnolly  took  the  
opportunity to visit with Audette whose ship was 
in  port. Soon after h is arrival, A udette gave a 
c o m p a rtm e n t by c o m p a rtm e n t to u r  of the  
Am herst providing both  Connolly and  B rand an 
in d ic a tio n  of th e  c o n d itio n s  on  C a n a d ia n  
corvettes. A udette recorded their reaction,
John  and I were good friends as children.. .He 
had never seen a corvette, which is why he came 
down. I took them all around the ship. Back in 
the wardroom Eric [Brand] sat down with a 
d rink  and  sa id  w ith a spark le , “its been 
interesting, bu t I can’t imagine how you get the 
bloody thing from A to B or how you fight it.”16
D uring th is to u r A udette observed th a t  on his 
m ost recent convoy (ON 137) he had  had  serious 
troub les w ith the C anad ian  designed and  built 
SWIC radar th a t apparently  “could not compare
3
Mayne: Bypassing the Chain of Command: The Political Origins of the RCN’
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2000
w ith the  [British] 2 7 1 .”17 Indeed, Connolly’s 
in te rest h ad  been peaked  especially since he 
found th a t  m any sailors were afraid to answ er 
his questions. B ut A udette w as more forthright 
in his depiction of the navy’s problem s especially 
w ith regard  to equipm ent. Also, Connolly took 
the opportun ity  to m eet w ith O’Brien. Over the 
ensu ring  year, bo th  of these  officers becam e 
valuable inform ants, the m ore so because  they 
were well respected  th ro u g h o u t the fleet and  
therefore could provide valuable in sigh ts.18
According to B rand , th is  experience h ad  
taugh t Connolly “w hat w as going on in the Navy 
at the tim e.” While A udette in troduced Connolly 
to the concept th a t the RCN w as suffering from 
e q u ip m e n t  p r o b le m s ,19 i t  w o u ld  b e  a n  
oversimplification to a ttach  too m uch em phasis 
to th is  im prom ptu  trip. Having sp en t only four 
days in  St. J o h n ’s and  visiting only a hand fu l of 
sh ip s  (A m h e rs t , Trillium , a n d  Arvida), it is 
unlikely th a t Connolly could have gained a true 
p icture of the s ta te  of the fleet. However, he was 
alerted  to the  fact th a t there  were deficiencies, 
telling one individual “th a t if w ar problem s were 
no t so terribly pressing, I th in k  conditions in 
the Service would be radically different th an  they 
are .”20 B ut it is significant th a t Connolly m et (or 
was reacquain ted  with) a num ber of operational 
reserve officers who were willing to provide him  
with direct observations on conditions within the 
fleet. For example, Sub Lieutenant J.S . Hodgson, 
RCNVR, told Connolly after he h a d  re tu rn ed  to 
Ottawa,
Glad you considered your trip a success. Being 
so m uch nearer the ships makes it possible for 
one to feel “useful” without the need of farsighted 
analysis. “B ubs” [Lt. J.C . Britton] has been 
asking about you, and asked to be remembered 
as did his colleague [Lt. J.H.] Kyle, also [LCdr. ]
Bob Keith, [Lt.] Charlie Donaldson -  and all 
points west. Haven’t seen Louis [Audette] since 
you left, but hope to eve soon. If at any time, 
John , you may w ant some (non-secret b u t 
personal) information which is hard  to get 
th ro u g h  official sou rces, let me help pis 
[please].21
H odgson’s offer to provide inform ation m u st 
have in te rested  Connolly. Prior to jo in ing  the 
navy, Hodgson had  been an  executive a ss is ta n t 
with the D epartm ent of L abour and  therefore 
had an  understanding  of Connolly’s duties. Also, 
he h ad  previously been posted  to NSHQ w here 
he w as a secre tary  a t naval board  an d  staff
m eetings. As indicated  in h is letter, it was clear 
t h a t  H o d g so n  b e lie v ed  t h a t  th e re  w as a 
divergence betw een NSHQ’s perception of the 
war a t sea and  the realities he was w itnessing in 
St. J o h n ’s.
D espite A udette’s com m ents on equipm ent 
an o th er issue  preoccupied bo th  Connolly and  
Macdonald once the executive assistan t returned 
to O ttaw a. M acLean, who had  re tu rn ed  to h is 
civilian profession as an  editor, was threaten ing  
to m ake h is  gripes w ith the  navy public un less 
M a cd o n a ld  in s t i tu te d  re fo rm . M acL ean ’s 
allegations th a t the morale of reserve officers was 
being effected by severe d iscrim ination  by the 
p e rm an en t force had  to take priority. Not only 
did M acLean have access to a public m edium ,22 
b u t he w as also a s ta u n c h  Conservative with 
strong  ties to the Party. D uring the early 1930s 
he h a d  been  Prim e M inister R.B. B e n n e tt’s 
private secre tary  and  the p resen t leader of the 
opposition, R.B. H anson, was a personal friend. 
Therefore, M acdonald could no t afford to ignore 
th is  w e ll-c o n n e c te d  a n d  in f lu e n tia l  m an , 
especially since MacLean was clearly em bittered 
tow ards the navy because  he had  ju s t  retired  
his com m ission u n d er d u re ss .23
Although M acdonald’s a tten tion  was draw n 
to quality  of life issues w ithin the reserves, h is 
in te r e s t  in  o p e ra t io n a l  d e ta i ls  h a d  b e e n  
heightened. On 8 D ecem ber 1942, he m et w ith 
the Radio D irection Finding Officer a t NSHQ, 
L ieutenant Com m ander Thom as J . Brown, RCN, 
for w hat only could be described as a tu to ria l 
on naval equipm ent. While the m in ister’s notes 
from th is m eeting indicate th a t Brown described 
the function  of all m ajor pieces of equipm ent 
u s e d  by th e  RCN, th e y  a lso  re in fo rc e  an  
im portan t po in t first m ade by h isto rian  M arc 
Milner th a t M acdonald possessed  an  extremely 
weak u n d e rs ta n d in g  of naval technology and  
warfare.24 For example, Macdonald described the 
highly technical Asdic as, “a type of radio -  you 
get echo from  h u ll of s u b m a r in e .”25 W hile 
M acdonald’s sudden  interest in naval equipm ent 
is compelling, it would take ten m onths and  the 
in troduction of S trange’s report before Connolly 
would take  th is  m atte r in h a n d  and  convince 
the m in iste r to im plem ent A udette’s p lan .26 In 
part, th is  w as because  there  were im portan t 
developm ents th roughou t the first ha lf of 1943 
tha t distracted the m inister thereby contributing 
to th is gap.
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Vice-Adm iral Percy W. N elles, ChieJ o f  the  N ava l S ta f f  (left), a n d  A n g u s  L. M acdonald , M in ister o f  N ational 
D efence fo r  N aval Serv ices (centre) v iew  a  m odel o f one o f  the  f l e e t ’s  n e w e s t escorts, HMCS Halifax, a  rev ised  
corvette .
One of the  m ost serious of these  events 
occurred in Ja n u a ry  1943 w hen M acLean m ade 
good on his th rea t to publish  h is grievances with 
the navy. As a result, betw een February to April, 
M acdonald and  Connolly were busy  defending 
the  navy as bo th  P arliam en t a n d  the  p ress  
w anted  to know w hether M acLean’s charges of 
re se rv e  p e r s e c u tio n  a t  th e  h a n d s  of th e  
p e rm a n en t force w ere valid .27 The M acLean 
episode was a delicate and  em barrassing  affair 
as one officer h ad  reported  to the  m in ister th a t 
he had  recently been to Toronto w here he found 
th a t  M acL ean’s ch arg es  w ere a n  extrem ely  
p o p u la r  topic of co n v ersa tio n  am o n g st the  
p o p u lac e .28 T herefore  b o th  M acdonald  an d  
Connolly were extrem ely su scep tib le  to any 
issues  th a t th rea tened  to become political.
Also, on 6 Ja n u a ry  1943, the  governm ent 
au thorized  the tran sfe r of all four RCN Mid­
A tlantic E scort G roups to the  RN. O stensibly, 
th is was to help the RN rearrange various convoy 
routes in order to alleviate an oil crisis in Britain. 
While th is w as given as the p rim ary  reason  for 
th e  t ra n s fe r  th e  B ritish  a lso  believed  th a t  
C anad ian  sh ip s were inefficient an d  w anted  to
reassign  the RCN groups to the UK to G ibraltar 
ro u te  w here they  w ould benefit from longer 
layover periods an d  closer proxim ity to train ing  
facilities.29 This w as an  ind ica tion  from  the 
British th a t there was som ething wrong with the 
RCN -  a fact th a t m u st have caused  M acdonald 
some discomfort in Cabinet.30 However, he could 
take comfort th a t once these ships returned  from 
B ritish control they would be better tra ined  and 
p o s s ib ly  e q u ip p e d . D u e  to  o p e ra t io n a l  
requ irem en ts in the  m id-A tlantic the  tran sfer 
w as neither as complete nor as long as originally 
envisioned by the B ritish .31 The degree to which 
these sh ips were m odernized during  th is period 
of B ritish  control is debatable, b u t  issu es  such  
as tra in ing  and  equipm ent, while no t forgotten 
by the RCN’s higher echelons, certainly appeared 
to be secondary  considera tions.32 This would 
change once S trange  w as in troduced  to the 
RCN’s m odernization problem s.
S tran g e , a  r is in g  s ta r  in  th e  C a n a d ian  
Broadcasting Corporation, was recruited into the 
Naval Inform ation B ranch  in Ja n u a ry  1942. As 
A ssistan t D irector of Naval Inform ation, one of 
S tran g e’s principal du ties  w as to write articles
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a n d  s p e e c h e s  on  th e  RCN fo r p u b l ic  
consum ption. Since joining the RCNVR, Strange 
had  spen t the m ajority of h is tim e a t NSHQ and 
he therefore had  little sea time or experience with 
an ti-su b m a rin e  w arfare  opera tions a t sea  -  
n a tu ra lly  m aking it difficult for him  to write on 
the subject. In Ju ly  1943, he secu red  a “roving 
com m ission” th a t would give him  the freedom  
to go from sh ip  to sh ip  an d  observe the w ar a t 
sea. For h is first passage it w as recom m ended 
th a t  he travel on HMS D uncan, w hich  w as 
comm anded by one of the m ost respected U-boat 
h u n te rs  of the war, C om m ander Peter G retton, 
RN. D u rin g  th is  tr ip  G re tto n  m an a g e d  to 
convince Strange “albeit reluctantly, to revise my 
firs t im pression ...H M C  S h ip s  were, a lm o st 
without exception, inadequately equipped to fight 
su b m a rin e s ...” This en co u n te r w ith G retton  
m e re ly  p ro v e d  to  be  th e  f i r s t  o f m a n y  
conversations with British and  C anadian officers 
on the m atte r  of equipm ent.
On the m orning of 13 July, Strange m et with 
Com m odore G.W.G. S im pson , RN, who w as 
C om m odore (D) in  L o n d o n d erry . S im p so n  
im m e d ia te ly  o p e n e d  th e  c o n v e rs a tio n  by 
observing th a t the RCN was woefully behind the 
RN in the m odernization of th e ir  escorts and  
th a t this was effecting their efficiency a t sea. The 
inference w as th a t NSHQ h ad  m ism anaged the 
RCN’s w ar effort b ec au se  of its  fixation  on 
quan tity  ra th e r  th an  quality , an d  th a t “fewer 
sh ips w ith b e tte r equipm ent...w ould  be m ore 
effective, and  our final record m ore im pressive.” 
Strange believed th a t he had  become S im pson’s 
confidant, a t least in part, because he had  been 
a m em ber of the RN during the F irst World War.33 
O ut of h is depth , S trange in sisted  th a t  these  
m atte rs  lay beyond his sphere  of influence, b u t 
S im pson persisted , explaining th a t he would 
take any  advantage to speak  w ith officers from 
NSHQ and  hoped th a t the  Inform ation Officer 
would “convey h is views to w hatever au tho rity  I 
[Strange] m ight th ink  appropriate  from the view 
point of effectiveness." Clearly, S im pson was 
advocating th a t  the chain  of com m and h ad  to 
be by-passed as Strange becam e convinced th a t 
“...th e  M in ister sh o u ld  be inform ed of th is  
conversation, and  any o thers th a t m ight arise 
therefrom .”34
W a n tin g  to  ta k e  a d v a n ta g e  of th is  
opportunity, Sim pson arranged a meeting on 15 
Ju ly  betw een S trange an d  C om m ander R.R.
S horto , RN, who w as the F leet E ngineering  
Officer, and  whose com m ents closely coincided 
w ith  S im p s o n ’s. S h o r to  re a liz e d  th a t  r e ­
equipping the RCN would not be an  easy task , 
b u t believed th a t NSHQ h ad  to overcome these 
deficiencies or else be p rep a red  to  face the  
consequences. For exam ple, once he re tu rn ed  
to O ttaw a, S trange would repea t to Connolly a 
dire p red iction  m ade by Shorto:
The dissatisfaction arises from the fact that it is 
impossible to birth alongside, or nearRN ships... 
without immediately observing the disparity in 
equipment between them and the vessels of the 
RCN. Commander Shorto personally feels a time 
may come when this feeling, at present only 
partially pent up, will come out into the open 
with consequences which cannot be foretold, but 
might be serious. He stated that there were 
certain [Canadian] officers, whose names he did 
not give, who were determined to take some form 
of drastic step to secure action in this m atter of 
equipm ent. I did not p ress inquiry in this 
direction.35
C onsidering th a t  S trange w as no t an  expert on 
naval equipment, it should not be surprising th a t 
these observations had  su ch  an  im pact on him. 
It was a t th is ju n c tu re  th a t Strange decided th a t 
h is  trip  h a d  sudden ly  “becom e som ething of a 
personal investigation.” In tu rn , he visited a 
n u m b er of C anad ian  w arsh ips w here he found 
am p le  e v id en ce  to s u p p o r t  S im p so n  a n d  
Shorto’s claims, one C anadian officer telling him  
th a t U -boats preferred  RCN-escorted convoys 
b e c a u s e  th e y  “offer s a fe r  ta rg e ts  d u e  to 
inadequacy of.. .A/S equipm ent... .1 encountered 
very se r io u s  d is s a tis fa c tio n  [by C a n a d ia n  
officers],” Strange later rem em bered, “combined 
w ith  th e  m o s t v ig o ro u s  c r i t ic is m  of th e  
responsible au tho rities  [NSHQ].”36 By the end 
of h is trip, S trange had  become "obsessed” with 
the s ta te  of equipm ent on C anad ian  w arsh ips. 
Although C anadian officers confirmed S trange’s 
susp icions, it is clear th a t it w as RN officers, 
m ost notably Gretton, Simpson, and  Shorto who 
m a n a g e d  to  im p r e s s  th e  im p o r ta n c e  of 
equipm ent as being one of the key issues  th a t 
effected the efficiency of the RCN.
Indeed, even before S tran g e’s visit various 
RN officers an d  their C anad ian  subo rd ina tes 
overseas h ad  been anxious to help the RCN 
recognize a n d  rem edy  th e ir  m o d ern iza tio n  
deficiencies. For exam ple, before listing  the 
problem s he saw  with the RCN, Piers recorded
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th a t his report was based on meetings with “such 
h igh -rank ing  Officers in  the  Royal Navy as the 
C om m ander-in-C hief W estern A pproaches, the 
F o rth  S ea  Lord, th e  C o m m an d e r-in -C h ie f  
Portsm outh, and  Commodore Londonderry. On 
these  occasions the successes and  problem s of 
the Royal C anad ian  Navy have been  frankly 
discussed. From these conversations, and  m any 
o ther in teresting  service contacts, the following 
facts em erge.” In p a rticu la r S im pson appeared  
to spearhead  th is  RN initiative. Having become 
C om m odore (D) on  26 April 1943, one of 
S im pson’s first priorities was the m odernization 
of the RCN as Piers reported  th a t  “Commodore
to the fire, repeating  a com m only held B ritish 
view th a t  the RCN’s corvettes were “probably 
more useful as rescue sh ips th an  anything else”
-  a rem arkable sta tem ent especially coming from 
a Canadian.38 It was a t this junctu re  th a t Strange 
decided to help Adams draft a  report th a t would 
be p assed  th rough  the chain  of com m and. The 
tone of these  two reports  could no t have been 
m ore different. While S trange’s accoun t w as a 
sca th ing  ind ictm ent, A dam s’ m em o w as more 
typical of any officer criticizing the actions of a 
s u p e r io r  a s  he  p o lite ly  o b se rv ed  th a t  h is  
subm ission  was “in tended  to draw  a tten tion  to 
the  m atte r  of equ ipm en t...in  order to enable
DND CN 3557
Typica l o f  the R C N 's problem  in 
1943, HMCS Sackville sp e n t the  
f i r s t  f i v e  m o n th s  o f  the  y e a r  in 
refit a n d  y e t  em erged  a s  s h e  is 
s e e n  h e r e  w i th  a n  o u td a te d  
bridge, sh o rt fo r e c a s tle  a n d  no 
hedgehog  or gyro  com pass.
JL
m
V \ *
Londonderry and  his Staff realize th a t C anadian 
p e rso n n e l are  n o t g e ttin g  th e  ch a n ce  they  
d e s e rv e , d u e  to  th e  la c k  of th e  l a t e s t  
e q u ip m e n t.”37 A lth o u g h  he h a d  in d ire c tly  
fashioned the Piers report, Sim pson was growing 
im p a tie n t,  a n d  th e re fo re  d e c id e d  to  ta k e  
advantage of Strange’s presence in Londonderry. 
This w as the b rea k th ro u g h  th a t  the  B ritish  
officers in Londonderry h ad  been w aiting for as 
S trange was easily persuaded  by their case. He 
w as now ready to re tu rn  to O ttaw a an d  m ake a 
difference -  ju s t  as S im pson h ad  hoped.
Having already w ritten  h is report, S trange 
boarded  HMCS Assirtiboine for h is re tu rn  trip 
to Canada. D uring th is voyage he d iscussed  the 
events of the previous week w ith C om m ander 
Ken Adams, RCN, com m anding officer of the 
Assiniboine. A dam s only m anaged  to add  fuel
them  to discharge the duties required. ”39 On the 
o ther hand , w ithou t the  need to include the 
formalities of addressing superiors, Strange was 
ab le  to p ro d u c e  a m u c h  m ore  b lu n t  a n d  
ou tspoken  docum ent.
The difference betw een these  two reports 
helps explain why certa in  RCNVR officers had  
m ore success in venting the navy’s deficiencies 
to h igher au tho rities  th a n  their RCN co u n te r­
p a rts . A lthough A dam s’ memo w as extrem ely 
tam e in  com parison  to S trange’s, he w as still 
afraid  th a t  there  w ould be consequences for 
criticizing NSHQ, believing th a t his “fat” was now 
“in the fire.” In fact, Adam s was convinced th a t 
w hen Nelles finally read  his report in November 
1943 he  dec ided  th a t  “[i]f y o u ’re going to 
com plain, you’ll be p u t in charge of fixing it” -  
lead ing  to h is  even tual ap p o in tm en t as the
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T h e  o rig in a l c o rv e tte  b ridge , 
l ik e  H M C S  M o n c to n ’s  s e e n  
here, during w ork-ups in M ay  
1 9 4 2 , w a s  i l l - s u i te d  to th e  
d e m a n d s  o f  w ar. T h e  
c h a r th o u s e ,  in  th e  le f t  
fo reg ro u n d , h o u se d  the  s h ip ’s  
only co m p a ss  — a  m agnetic  one  
— a n d  the  trace recorder fo r  the  
p rim a tive  ty p e  123A  a sd ic  set, 
b u t the  cap ta in  h a d  to f ig h t  h is  
s h ip  f r o m  o u t s id e  a n d  th e  
c h a r th o u se  its e l f  p r e v e n te d  a  
fu l l  3 6 0  degree  v iew  o f  even ts . 
T he cra m p ed  bridge w in g s  d id  
_ w ell to accom m odate  the  tw in  
,<o .50 calibre m ach ine  g u n s  se e n  
5 here.
Director of Warfare and  T raining ra ther th a n  his 
preferred posting to the arm ed m erchant cruiser 
Prince H enry.40 Unlike the RCNVR, who had  
civilian jobs to re tu rn  to once the  w ar ended, 
RCN officers h ad  m ade the navy their livelihood 
and m istakes could m ean the end of their career. 
As a resu lt, they had  to g uard  their professions 
and according to Strange “the whole atm osphere 
stifled in itia tive .” In fact, S im pson h a d  told 
S trange th a t he h ad  “briefed m ore sen io r RCN 
officers in the  m atte r [of equipm ent], w ithout 
resu lt [but] since I was a ‘hostilities only’ reserve 
officer, I h ad  no career to risk, even if I were to 
take extrem e m easures...[h ]e  pointed  o u t th a t 
th e  ‘p ro p e r  c h a n n e ls ’ h a d  p ro v ed  to ta lly  
in e f f e c t iv e .”41 S im p s o n ’s a r g u m e n t  w a s  
convincing, as S trange’s u ltim ate  goal w as to 
e n s u re  th a t  th e  m in is te r  saw  h is  re p o r t . 
Justify ing  h is decision after the war, S trange 
rem arked  that: “I felt, and  still feel, th a t in  such  
c ircum stances, the only action w orth tak ing  a t 
all is the one you know positively will be effective. 
The p ro p er ch a n n e ls  w ould have to be b y ­
passed . It w as quite c lear th a t  they did no t 
w ork.”42
“watchdog” of the navy and th a t the key to getting 
M acdonald ’s a tte n tio n  w as to convince the 
executive a s s is ta n t  of the  m agn itude  of the 
problem. Although one of Connolly’s duties was 
to protect the m inister from politically dangerous 
issues, he was also a com passionate and  honest 
m an who was deeply concerned about the quality 
of life for sa ilo rs  a t sea. S trange, therefore, 
realized th a t  the m in ister’s aid  w as m ore likely 
to ta k e  n o tice  if h e  in c lu d e d  som e of th e  
ex travagant s ta tem en ts  m ade by the officers in 
Londonderry. This does no t m ean  th a t S trange 
believed th a t  Connolly an d  M acdonald would 
only take  an  in te rest in equipm ent if it w as 
“politicized.” B ut he knew th a t there were a great 
n u m b er of issues  th a t em broiled the m in iste r’s 
a tten tion  on a day to day basis, and  therefore 
only w anted  to en su re  th a t equipm ent w as p u t 
on the top of the list.
S trange no t only hoped th a t h is influence 
would lead to changes with the RCN’s equipm ent 
policy, b u t also feared th a t the s ta te  of the navy 
could pose dangers for M acdonald’s political 
career explaining that,
Of course, the question arises how a reserve 
officer of S trange’s relatively ju n io r  ra n k  could 
have d irect access to the  m in ister?  As w ith 
A udette , Connolly proved to be the link  as 
S trange la te r adm itted  to a fellow officer th a t, 
“Jo h n , besides being a  personal friend of m ine, 
is Executive A ssistan t to the Naval M inister.”43 
S tran g e  u n d e rs to o d  th a t  Connolly w as the
There is certain invulnerability about the “high 
b rass” in any Service. Ministers, however, are 
not invulnerable. They cannot ignore serious 
political considerations. The threat of serious 
trouble in the fleet, which I had heard voiced, 
and which commonsense would show m ust 
obviously exist in the circumstances I described, 
was not one which any politician could ignore. 
A p art from  th is , Mr. M acdonald  w ould
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im m ediately apprecia te  the  b roader im plications 
of the  w hole m a tte r .44
Considering the political climate during  A ugust 
1943  M a c d o n a ld  h a d  good re a s o n  to  be 
concerned  w ith the s ta te  of the navy. In fact, 
M acdonald had been em barrassed a t the Quebec 
C o n fe re n c e  a f te r  W in s to n  C h u rc h il l  h a d  
m entioned  th a t he h ad  no idea th a t  the  RCN’s 
contribution to the Battle of Atlantic was as large 
or im portan t as prim e m in ister William Lyon 
M ackenzie King had  told him. This s tru c k  as 
an o th e r indication from the B ritish  th a t  the 
C anadians were not pulling their weight w hen it 
cam e to sinking U -boats.45
S uch  revelations could no t have come a t a 
w orse time. King’s governm ent w as in a virtual 
s ta te  of panic as the ranks of the Ontario Liberal 
party  had  been decim ated in a provincial election 
and  four federal by-elections all w ent against the 
governm ent. B ut as King observed there  were 
some cabinet m em bers who appeared to be more 
worried th an  o thers recording in  h is diary that, 
“A ngus M acdonald w as very pessim istic  abou t 
the  P a rty ’s p o s itio n .”46 It is n o t difficult to 
imagine, therefore, w hat the consequences would 
have been for M acdonald had  serious problem s 
w ithin the fleet been publicly revealed in August 
1943.
Since he was responsible for the navy, there 
can  also be little doub t th a t M acdonald was 
disturbed by Shorto’s claim th a t some Canadian 
sailors were on the verge of taking drastic  action 
to s e c u re  e q u ip m e n t, o r th a t  th e re  w ere 
unforeseeable consequences for the  feeling of 
frustra tion  am ongst the sea-going navy. In fact, 
the m inister personally telephoned S trange and 
told him  “th a t he h ad  read  the m em orandum , 
w hich had  caused  him  deep concern. He asked 
me to give the  m ost definite a ssu ra n c e  of the 
tru th  and  accuracy  of s ta te m e n ts .” M acdonald 
then  rea ssu red  S trange tha t, no m atte r  w hat 
m ight happen  next, he would be protected from 
any retaliation from “the navy.” B ut Strange was 
n o t afraid -  after all he had  a career w ith the
T h e  n erv e  c en tre  o f  th e  ea rly  co rve tte s: a  s in g le  
A d m ira lty  p a tte rn  1960  m agnetic  co m p a ss  binnacle, 
w ith  a  h a n d w h e e l m o u n ted  to control th e  direction  
o j  th e  sh ip 's  T y p e  123A  A sd ic  transducer, a n d  a  
sim p le  chem ical recorder on the left w ith  earphone  
ja c k s  on the s ta n d  fo r  the  A sd ic  operator a n d  a n ti­
su b m a rin e  officer.
CBC w aiting for him  if need be .47 Also it h ad  
been his goal to get M acdonald’s atten tion  in the 
m ost graphic way possible and  clearly th is  aim  
h ad  been achieved.
No doub t effected by the political clim ate, 
M acdonald immediately tu rned  to the naval staff 
for answ ers. On 21 August, he ordered Nelles to 
report on the s ta te  of equipm ent on C anad ian  
w arships. He gave no indication th a t h is request 
w as b ased  on S tran g e’s observations, b u t  ju s t  
th a t  he w anted  a report as soon as possible. 
R espond ing  on 1 S ep tem b er Nelles tre a te d  
M a cd o n a ld ’s a p p e a l in  g en e ra l te rm s  an d  
c la im ed  th a t  it w as im p o ss ib le  to d ra f t  a 
com parison between equipm ent on RN and RCN 
sh ip s .48 M acdonald w as u n h ap p y  w ith Nelles’s 
answ er an d  thereafter questioned  any fu rther 
inform ation he received from his CNS. He felt 
th a t the naval staff had  hidden this problem from 
him , an d  Connolly even su spec ted  a  cover-up. 
In fairness, however, Nelles had  told M acdonald 
in  e a rly  1943 th a t  th e re  w ere e q u ip m e n t 
problem s with the C anadian  navy. For example, 
in  F ebruary  the CNS h ad  s ta ted  to M acdonald 
th a t he “considers it essential to have forecastles 
extended, bridges im proved an d  all desirable 
m odifications to a rm am en t on RCN Corvettes
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W h a t a  m o d e rn e r ize  co rve tte  
bridge looked  like by  m id-w ar: 
H M C S  B randon  in  N o vem b er  
1943. T he  sq u a re  box on the  
fr o n t  o f  the  bridge h o u se d  the  
a s d ic  e q u ip m e n t ,  a  g y r o  
c o m p a ss  repea ter is m o u n te d  
j u s t  a h e a d  o f  th e  m a g n e tic  
c o m p a s s  b in n a c le  a n d  
m oun ting  f o r  2 0  m m  O erlikon  
g u n s  can  be s e e n  on e ither side.
NACPA 184193
[made] as soon as possible.” Nelles adm itted th a t 
59 co rve ttes  n eeded  to be m odern ized  b u t 
providing th a t the B ritish  could a ss is t in  th is 
process all would be well with the navy.49 Further, 
M acdonald had  attended  various naval board  
m eetings th roughou t the w in ter of 1942-1943 
w hen the equipm ent requ irem en ts of the  navy 
were d iscussed . Finally, besides com plaining 
abou t p e rm an en t force d iscrim ination, one of 
M acLean’s cen tra l a rg u m e n ts  w as th a t  the  
equipm ent on som e types of C anad ian  escorts 
w as s u b s ta n d a rd  claim ing  th a t  “[t]he m ore 
technical side of the Fairm ile equipm ent w as in 
a n  even  m ore d isg ra c e fu l s ta te  of official 
in ep titu d e .”50 These com plain ts fixated on the 
RCN’s E ast C oast fairmile fleet, w hich MacLean 
had  been the Senior Officer, b u t h is charges 
am oun ted  to a dam ning  ind ictm ent of NSHQ’s 
attitude towards equipping the entire escort fleet 
in general. In fact, while preparing the m inister’s 
defence to MacLean’s charges, Connolly and  the 
naval staff had  told M acdonald th a t “no claim to 
perfection shou ld  be m ade. The Naval Service 
in three years of w ar grew phenom enally in m en 
a n d  sh ip s , m is ta k e s  h ave  b e e n  m a d e .. .”51 
Therefore, M acdonald’s contention that the naval 
s ta f f  h a d  n e v e r  c o n v e y e d  th e  R C N ’s 
m odernization problem s to him  was not entirely 
true.
B ut here in  lies the difference betw een the 
m a n n e r  in  w hich reserve  officers (su ch  as 
S trange) co m m u n ica ted  the  p rob lem s w ith
m odernization to M acdonald as com pared to the 
naval staff. Using highly technical term s and  
statistical da ta  naturally  would not have had  the 
sam e im pact on a civilian m in ister as S trange’s 
o sten ta tious  memo. Indeed, the Londonderry 
officers h ad  picked the perfect m essenger, as 
S tra n g e ’s co lo u rfu l u se  of a d je c tiv e s  a n d  
m e ta p h o r s  w a s  r e m in is c e n t  of h is  p a s t  
experience as a w riter for the CBC. Although he 
h a d  s u c c e s s fu lly  c a p tu re d  th e  m in is te r ’s 
attention, the unfortunate byproduct of Strange’s 
methodology was that he also caused Macdonald 
to lose faith  in  h is naval advisors. This led to a 
complete breakdow n in com m unication between 
M acdonald and  his naval staff.
In fact, there were no sim ple answ ers to the 
RCN’s equipm ent dilemma. C anadian shipyards 
were inexperienced and  shorthanded  and  in any 
event their nu m b ers  were barely  sufficient to 
hand le  the RCN’s construc tion  program s - let 
alone its refit requirem ents. Shipyards could not 
be b u i l t  o v e rn ig h t  a n d  th e re fo re  i t  is 
u n d e rs ta n d ab le  why NSFIQ appealed  to the  
British for help. In an unfortunate tu rn  of events 
for the naval staff their p lan  for British assistance 
h a d  to  be a b a n d o n e d . On 24 A u g u s t th e  
Admiralty informed NSFIQ th a t they “regret th a t 
heavy p ressu re  of refitting and  o ther sh ip  work 
in h an d  and  in prospect in th is country  renders 
rem ote any  likelihood of u n dertak ing  even a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f w o rk  o n  r e m a in in g  
[Canadian] sh ips in q uestion .”52
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss3/2
Unaware th a t M acdonald’s a tten tion  h ad  so 
recently  been d raw n to equipm ent by Strange, 
the  naval staff m ade a fatal b lu n d er by not 
im m ediately telling the m inister th a t the British 
could n o t a ss is t in  the m odernization process. 
In tim e th is  episode would be u sed  to show  the 
naval staff th a t they h ad  been  derelict in their 
du ty  to properly brief the  m inister. At the  time, 
however, M acdonald needed  a new  source of 
information. Since he no longer tru sted  his naval 
advisors, allowing h is executive a s s is ta n t to 
investigate the situation appeared to be the m ost 
logical m eans to ga ther m ore data .
Q uestion ing  the  naval s ta f f s  reliability , 
Connolly tu rned  to h is friends in the RCNVR for 
information. While Connolly had  com m unicated 
w ith these officers before S trange’s interference, 
th e ir  co rresp o n d en ce  becam e m ore critical 
during the second half of 1943. Interestingly, they 
often u se d  poetry  or coded m essages w hen 
discussing problems within the fleet. In part, this 
w as probably  b ecau se  they were d iscussing  
highly sensitive m atters th a t would be governed 
by the Defence of C anada regulations. Also, since 
th e se  officers w ere b y p a ss in g  th e  c h a in  of 
com m and it would no t be beneficial to expose 
th e m s e lv e s  to  a p o s s ib le  c h a rg e  of 
insubordination if discovered by anyone else b u t 
Connolly. It appears th a t the executive assis tan t 
recognized th is th rea t him self as he w arned one 
of these  officers th a t  the ir letters “sh o u ld  be 
com posed with c ircum spection .”53
M uch of th is  poetry is difficult to decipher, 
b u t  it is obvious th a t it w as u sed  as a m eans of
com m unication. For exam ple, after describ ing 
l e a d e r s h ip  p ro b le m s  a t  N SH Q , S t ra n g e  
recorded:
I have written this
For the few people whom 1 know
Who will understand what 1 am getting at.
One used to believe in Christmas and the Navy.
Who knows now in what he believes.54
Com plaints on naval leadership were a common 
th e m e  w ith in  C o n n o lly ’s p o e try  file, b u t  
e q u ip m e n t  w a s  a lso  d is c u s s e d . In  th e s e  
instances, it was common for medical conditions 
to be u sed  to replace naval term s an d  secret 
equipm ent. For exam ple, in a le tte r to A udette 
in  November 1943, Connolly wrote:
I am very m uch concerned about your wife’s 
c o n d itio n  [HMCS A m h e r s t l .  I w ould  be 
particularly interested to know the result of her 
operation [refit]. I should love to be available 
for the conference of surgeons under Simpson, 
when you get to tha t point... .1 wish you would 
let me know what the surgeons [refit facilities] 
did during the sum m er and if you feel she is in 
as fit condition as the other ladies [corvettes] 
particularly the English ladies.. .1 am, personally 
dissatisfied about the treatm ent which people 
like yourself have been given for your wives' 
condition. I need not tell you th a t Angus 
[Macdonald] is too.55
Clearly, Connolly w as ask ing  ab o u t Am herst's  
refit, especially since A udette never m arried. 
Replying to th is letter, Audette reported th a t his 
“wife” w as in a m uch  b e tte r  s ta te  b u t th a t  the 
C anadian  “doctors” (shipyards) took too long “as 
they are doing in all sim ilar cases.” Appreciative
W hat a  m odern  a sd ic  s e t  looked  
like in 1943: a  typ e  144 in an  
u n k n o w n  RCN ship . Com pare  
th is  w ith  th e  ty p e  1 2 3 A  s e t  
il lu s tra te d  on  p a g e  15 w h ich  
w a s  com m on to RCN corvettes  
in 1943.
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of h is  f r ie n d ’s in te re s t ,  A u d e tte  th e n  felt 
compelled to tell Connolly that,
Anything you can do for girls [corvettes] in her 
position will be more than an ordinary good turn.
I shall not fail to pass onto other husbands 
[corvette captains] in my fix that you are helping.
It will buck them up no end when they so often 
feel let down.56
Incidentally, J im  Mitchell also used  th is  type of 
term inology to keep Connolly a b reas t of the 
conditions on the Orillia.57 While the ir m ethod
p o sition  of hav ing  access  to the  m in is te r’s 
executive assistant. As comm anding officers they 
felt th a t the problem s with the RCN’s escort fleet 
were h indering  their efforts to h u n t  U -boats. 
A d d itio n a lly , th e  e q u ip m e n t  d e fic ie n c ie s  
endangered the lives of their crew s and  those of 
the m erchan t sh ips they  were trying to protect. 
B ut it is im p o rta n t to n o te  th a t, w ith  the  
e x c e p t io n  of A u d e tte , th e s e  ty p e s  of 
com m u n ica tio n s  only began  once Connolly 
needed assistance . Since Connolly no longer 
tru s te d  the  naval s ta ff he requ ired  an o th e r
The object o f  the  R C N ’s  d e s ire  in 1943: the  fu l ly  m od ern ized  corvette, 
HM CS Shediac in 1944. N ote the  hedgehog  j u s t  fo r w a r d  o f  the  bridge.
of com m unication  m ay have been  creative, the 
m ost im p o rta n t p o in t is th a t  th ese  RCNVR 
officers were p assing  inform ation  directly  to 
Connolly who would th en  show  som e of these  
subm issions to M acdonald. For exam ple, after 
read ing  one of O’B rien ’s poem s M acdonald  
scribbled a note to Connolly th a t “[tjhis officer 
h as  a gift for writing w hich he shou ld  continue 
to develop.”58 Also, as indicated by Audette, they 
were sp read ing  word to o ther RCNVR officers 
th a t Connolly was sym pathetic to their cause.
T h ro u g h  th e ir  p re -w a r  fr ie n d sh ip  w ith  
C onnolly th ese  officers w ere in  the  u n iq u e
source of inform ation, an d  there  was no one 
b e tte r to ask  th a n  old an d  tru s te d  friends who 
happened  to be serving where the problem s 
w ithin the navy would be m ost apparent. There 
was no m alicious in ten t in Connolly’s req u est 
for a ssis tan ce , no r in these  officers decision to 
help, ju s t  a desire to see the welfare of the  fleet 
improved.
The Strange memo proved to be the im petus 
th a t  convinced Connolly to follow A ude tte ’s 
O c to b e r  1942  s u g g e s tio n  fo r a th o ro u g h  
investiga tion  in to  the  RCN’s m odern iza tion  
problem s. On 20 S ep tem ber 1943 Connolly
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wrote to A udette claim ing th a t M acdonald had 
finally agreed to his plan. At this junctu re  Audette 
recom m ended th a t  Connolly jo in  h im  in the 
A m herst in  order to experience a tran sa tlan tic  
sea  voyage. B ut A m herst w as schedu led  for a 
refit an d  Connolly could  no t afford to wait. 
Unable to a ss is t in h is brainchild , A udette was 
“very  d isa p p o in te d  o u r  p la n s  h ave  fa llen  
through, however, it obviously can ’t be helped ...
I w ish you every good luck  & lots of joy and  
knowledge.”59
As w ith  A udette , S tra n g e  a lso  a s s is te d  
C onno lly  in  p re lim in a ry  p la n n in g  for h is  
investigation. On the m orning of 21 Septem ber, 
Connolly m et w ith S trange who revealed th a t 
there w as a netw ork of officers in Londonderry 
who w anted  to improve the s ta te  of equipm ent 
on RCN ships. Later th a t day Strange stated  that 
he  h a d  d isp a tc h e d  le tte rs  to S im p so n  an d  
Shorto, am ongst m any others, announcing  th a t 
the executive a s s is ta n t w as traveling overseas. 
In reality he was mobilizing these officers so th a t 
they would be p repared  to give Connolly their 
particu lar interpretation of the RCN’s equipm ent 
problem s. For example, Strange told L ieutenant 
C om m ander F.O. Gerity, RCNR, who w as on 
S im p so n ’s s taff, th a t  th is  w as h is  “golden 
opportunity  to say  w hat you th ink , w ithou t the 
s l ig h te s t  fear of c o n se q u e n c e s , to  a m an  
[Connolly] who can quickly get it to all the places 
from  w h ich  a c tio n  w ill c e r ta in ly  c o m e .”60 
Likewise, S trange also wrote to A dam s th a t 
Connolly w as “fully in  my confidence over the 
ba ttle  I am  trying to wage for the  m an  a t sea, 
an d  is n o t only entirely sym pathetic  w ith the 
c a u s e  b u t  is  c a p a b le  of f u r th e r in g  it 
considerably.” Realizing th a t Connolly’s trip was 
largely the re su lt of h is decision to bypass the 
c h a in  of com m and , S tra n g e  c o n tin u e d  by 
quipping  “so far, very m uch  to my su rp rise , I 
have n o t been sh o t.”61 While S trange deserves 
credit for m aking equipm ent an  issue  w ith the 
m in is te r ,  h e  w a s  c o r r e c t  to  w a r n  th e  
L o n d o n d e r ry  o f f ic e rs  t h a t  C o n n o lly ’s 
investigation would be the key to producing  
tangib le resu lts . M acdonald m ay have been 
suspicious of his naval staff, b u t he was unwilling 
to ac t w ithou t fu rth e r evidence. The “b a ttle ” as 
S trange called it, would soon be in their hands.
Even though he could n o t travel overseas 
with Audette, Connolly still wanted to experience
a transatlan tic  voyage and so decided to sail with 
M itchell in  the Orillia.62 Also it w as ironic th a t 
one of M itchell’s officers w as B arry O’B rien’s 
brother, Gerald, who believed th a t Connolly was 
“checking u p ” on him  a t the  req u est of Jo h n  
A m brose O’Brien.63 W ith close friends a t hand , 
Connolly boarded  the Orillia on 10 October to 
begin  h is  h isto ric  investigation . A lthough it 
w ould be the overseas officers who would have 
th e  g re a te s t  im p a c t on  h is  in v e s tig a tio n , 
C o n n o lly ’s RCNVR c o m p a t r io ts  w e re  a 
significant factor in  its form ation an d  p lanning  
stages. It w as Connolly him self who placed this 
into perspective w hen he advised Audette th a t “I 
certain ly  w ish I could ta lk  to you an d  a lot of 
o thers  like you, however, you can  say  to your 
friends th a t  if I c anno t ta lk  to you, I certainly 
can an d  have talked for you.”64 Clearly, Connolly 
was insinuating th a t the RCNVR had  finally been 
heard , an d  th a t  he w as determ ined  to en su re  
th a t  the ir grievances were no longer ignored. 
P erhaps the b es t sum m ation  of th is  episode, 
however, cam e from Strange,
In retrospect, it appears to have been an almost 
n ig h tm a rish  exam ple of how a m ilita ry  
Headquarters can become so remote from the 
realities as actually to stultify its own raison 
d ’etre. They were living in cloud cuckooland, 
while sailors were dying. There is a lesson here.65
W hether the naval staff w as totally to blam e for 
the RCN’s equipm ent problems is debatable, and 
in  fact it could be reasonab ly  argued  th a t  both  
A udette and  S trange’s actions only m anaged to 
com plicate the  s itua tion . As h a s  been  shown, 
the naval staff had  told Macdonald that the escort 
fleet needed to be m odernized. They h a d  also 
s ta ted  th a t the only logical course of action was 
to ask  the  B ritish  for a ssis tance . In h indsight, 
their m istake was th a t they failed to explain these 
com plicated an d  highly technical issu es  to the 
m in i s te r  in  t e r m s  t h a t  h e  c o u ld  e a s ily  
com prehend. Also they did not repeat or im press 
its tru e  significance upon  him. In their defence, 
however, it is im portant to note th a t after he had 
been  alerted  to th is  problem  over the  w in ter of 
1942-43 M acdonald never asked for u pda tes  or 
elaboration. As a  resu lt, S trange’s flam boyant 
charges caught M acdonald by surprise  a t a time 
w hen he w as politically vulnerable and  in stead  
of w orking w ith h is naval staff to find solutions 
he agreed to allow his assistan t to travel overseas 
to investigate.
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T herefore, the  e x p la n a tio n  for how  the  
“eq u ip m en t c ris is” becam e su c h  a political 
quagm ire rests with the actions of a sm all group 
of C anadian  reserve officers in conjuncture with 
th o se  of RN a u th o r i t ie s  in  L o n d o n d e rry . 
Beginning with Audette in the fall of 1942, these 
officers realized th a t Connolly w as the crucial 
link to the m inister and  subsequently  the key to 
p ro d u c in g  change w ith  NSHQ’s eq u ip m en t 
policy. Throughout 1943 some individuals, m ost 
notably  the officers in  Londonderry, becam e 
convinced th a t the chain  of com m and was slow 
and  often appeared  to be unresponsive. Led by 
two senior ranking  RN officers, these C anadian  
rese rv is ts  realized th a t  they  needed  to u se  
unconventional m eans to get NSHQ’s attention. 
S im pson quickly recognized th a t, as a reserve 
officer from  NSHQ, S tra n g e  w as th e  ideal 
candidate to be their messenger. Indeed, Strange 
h ad  becom e obsessed; discovering th a t there  
were a  num ber of C anadian reserve officers who 
desperately  w anted  to see the RCN properly 
eq u ip p e d . T h is  is n o t to im ply  th a t  th e ir  
criticism s did no t have m erit as the RCN was 
alm ost one year beh ind  the RN in m odernizing 
its sh ips, b u t there  were o ther problem s w ith 
the navy (e.g. train ing and  m anning) w hich were 
of e q u a l  im p o r ta n c e  a n d  a ls o  r e q u i r e d  
resolution.
Not all reserve officers would have agreed th a t 
equipm ent w as the m ost crucial problem  w ith 
the RCN, b u t some of those who were convinced 
m anaged to convey their concerns directly to the 
highest authority. Having alerted Connolly in the 
m ost graphic n a tu re , S trange w as able to tu rn  
th is  p a rtic u la r  opera tional deficiency in to  a 
th reat for Macdonald by implying that there were 
serious political im plications associa ted  w ith 
discontented officers and  the state  of equipm ent. 
O ccurring on the  heels of the  “M acLean affair,” 
bo th  M acdonald and  Connolly were extrem ely 
sensitive abou t any issue th a t could once again 
sub jec t the  navy to public scru tiny . S tran g e’s 
descrip tion of the  sta te  of equipm ent appeared  
to fit th e  bill. Once th is  seed  w as p lan ted , 
Connolly tu rn e d  to h is  sea-going con tac ts for 
more inform ation. Asking specific questions on 
e q u ip m e n t, th e re fo re , on ly  re in fo rc e d  th e  
perception th a t th is was the p rim ary  grouse of 
the seagoing fleet. No longer tru s tin g  the top 
b rass , and  already convinced th a t equipm ent 
was a political th re a t to the  m inister, Connolly 
needed to g a ther evidence so th a t M acdonald
could m ake a case aga in st the  naval staff. The 
problem  with Connolly’s investigation, however, 
was th a t the proof cam e from a group of officers 
who did no t have a com plete p ic tu re  of the 
troubles NSHQ faced w hen trying to m odernize 
the RCN. Subsequen tly , Connolly was given a 
dram atic  an d  often one-sided in terp re ta tion . 
R e g a r d le s s ,  th e  in fo r m a t io n  fro m  h is  
investigation w as u sed  to build  a case against 
the naval staff as it w as argued  th a t they  had  
no t only m ism anaged  the m odernization of the 
RCN, b u t  a lso  failed  to p ro p erly  b rie f  th e  
m inister. In tu rn  the naval s ta ff denied these 
charges of incom petence leading to a d ram atic  
a n d  b i t te r  c o n fro n ta tio n  w ith  M acd o n a ld  
th ro u g h o u t Novem ber an d  D ecem ber 1943. 
Rightly or wrongly, it would be Nelles who paid  
the price as R ear Admiral G.C. Jo n es  replaced 
him  as the CNS in Ja n u a ry  1944. *1
Notes
1. R obert F isher, “The Im pact of G erm an Technology on 
the RCN in the Battle of the A tlantic, 1942-1943 .” The 
N o rth ern  M ariner, VII N o.4; M arc M ilner, "The 
Im plications ofTechnological Backwardness: The Royal 
C a n a d ia n  Navy 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 ,” C a n a d ia n  D efen ce  
Q uarterly, 19 No.3.
2. R ichard  M ayne, B ehind the Scenes a t Naval Service 
H eadquarters: Bureaucratic an d  the D ism issal o f Vice 
Admiral Percy W. Nelles, (WLU: unpublished MA thesis, 
1998).
3. For an excellent sum m ary of these m em oranda see Marc 
Milner, North A tlantic R un  (Toronto: U niversity  of 
Toronto  P ress, 1985), an d  David Z im m erm an, The 
Great Naval B attle  o j O ttaw a  (Toronto: U niversity of 
T oronto  P ress, 1989). C ap ta in  Rowland w rote his 
m em orandum  on 1 May 1943 w hen he was C aptain (D) 
Newfoundland. L ieu tenant C om m ander Piers w as the 
c o m m a n d in g  o fficer of HMCS R e s tig o u c h e  a n d  
subm itted  h is report through the chain of com m and to 
NSHQ on 1 J u n e  1943. The final m em orandum  w as 
actually  com posed by six officers u n d e r the au tho rity  
of C aptain  R.E.S. Bidwell who w as the Chief of Staff to 
the Com m ander-in-Chief C anadian  Northwest Atlantic.
4. Piers to Rowland, C om m ents on the Operation and  
Performance o f H.M.C. Ships, 1 J u n e  1943, N ational 
Archives of C anada [NAC1 RG 24, 3997, NSS 1057-3­
24 Vol.l.
5. During the Second Would War C anada’s navy consisted 
of th ree different b ranches. The Royal C anad ian  Navy 
V olunteer Reserve (RCNVR) w ere civilians who h ad  
jo ined  the navy for the du ra tion  of hostilities only. The 
Royal C anad ian  Navy Reserve (RCNR) were m erch an t 
m arine sailors who had joined the navy for the duration  
of the war. On the o ther h an d , RCN personnel were 
perm anent force, meaning that the navy was their career. 
Of course, certa in  RCNVR officers used  h u m o u r to
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss3/2
describe the differences w hereby, “The RCNVR were 
gentlem an trying to be sailors. The RCNR were sailors 
trying to be gentlemen, while the RCN were neither trying 
to be b o th .”
6. C ap ta in  Eric B rand, Interview  by E.C. R ussell, taped 
recording transcrip t, D epartm ent of National Defence, 
D irectorate of H istory and  H eritage, O ttaw a [DHH], 
B rand Papers, 8 4 / 145. Vol.7,25.
7. H ouse of Com m ons, D ebates, 11 Ju n e  1943, p .3564.
8. C harles M urphy to Connolly. 17 J a n u a ry  1933, NAC, 
Connolly Papers. MG 32 C 71, Vol 2:16. The o ther 
p a rtn e r  in th is law  firm w as Jo h n  O’Brien. D espite 
sim ilar nam es, th is  p a rtn e r  w as n o t re la ted  to Jo h n  
B arry O’Brien. I am  grateful to Mrs. F rances O’Brien 
for th is  in fo rm ation . C onnolly  to JT  H acke tt, 15 
November 1943. NAC. Connolly Papers. MG32 C71, 
Vol.2: 17. Within this letter Connolly wrote to Mitchell’s 
employer “I knew Jim  [Mitchell] when I w as [practicing] 
w ith Jo h n  O 'Brien in M ontreal.”
9. Scott Young and  Astrid Young, O’Brien: From Water Boy 
to One Million a  Year (Burnstown. Ontario: The General 
S tore Publishing House, 1967), pp. 180-182.
10. Connolly to Audette, 25 November 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG 32 C 71, Vol 2:17.
11. Audette to Connolly, 5 December 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG 32 C 71. Vol 2:18.
12. B rand  Diary. O ctober 1942, DHH. B rand  Papers, 8 1 / 
145, 58 . R eport o f P roceedings fo r  the  m o n th  o f 
October 1942, 9 November 1942. DHH, FONF R of P 
M onthy Sept 42-M ar 43, Vol.2.
13. Connolly diary, February 1942. NAC, Connolly Papers, 
MG 32 C71, Vol 2: 4. Connolly th o u g h t very highly of 
B rand . For exam ple, after the ir in itial m eeting  he 
rem arked  th a t, “B rand, the CNI [sic] is an  R.N. m an  -  
cam e in 1939 and  does a w hale of a job. Too b ad  he 
d idn 't come sooner.”
14. S chu ll's  incom plete w ar m em oirs, nd . NAC Joseph  
Schull Papers MG 31 D5, Vol.76.
15. M acLean to Connolly. 15 Ju ly  1942, NAC. Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3-8. A nonym ous R eport, nd. 
(July 1942). NAC. Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3- 
8. Confidential Report on Efficiency o f RCN (Atlantic 
Seaboard), NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32, C71, Vol.3- 
8. Com m ents on Confidential Report on Efficiency o f 
RCN (Atlantic Seaboard), NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 
C71, Vol.3-8.
16. Louis Audette, interview  w ith AOS (Salty Dips project) 
in Salty Dips, Vol.2, ed. Mac Lynch (Ottawa: Privately 
Printed. 1985). p.64.
17. Connolly Diary, O ctober 1942, NAC, Connolly Papers, 
MG32 C71, Vol. 2:4. Louis Audette, Naval Recollections, 
DHH. Audette Papers. 8 0 /2 5 6 . Folder 9, 51.
18. B rand  diary, O ctober 1942, DHH, an d  B rand  Papers, 
81 / 145, p.58; John  Connolly to Ida Connolly, 9 October 
1943, NAC. Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol 1-1. 
Connolly w rote to h is wife ju s t  prior to h is  d ep artu re  
for Londonderry. Referring to h is O ctober 1942 trip to 
St. John 's, Connolly found that, “This time they (RCNVR 
sailors) have really tak en  the ir ha ir down and  I picked 
up  inform ation th a t I never dream ed I could get.” Jack  
H odgson  to  C onnolly , 22 N ovem ber 1942, NAC, 
Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:15. Mac Johnston , 
Corvettes Canada: Convoy Veterans of'W W  II Tell their 
true stories. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill R yerson, 1994), 
p.270.
19. Connolly D iary, 26 O ctober 1943. NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:4.
20. Connolly to C dr A ndrew  MacLean, 2 D ecem ber 1943, 
P ublic  A rchives of Nova S co tia  [PANS), A ngus L. 
M acdonald Papers, MG 2, F 818 /46 .
21. H odgson  to C onnolly , 22 N ovem ber 1942, NAC, 
Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:15.
22. MacLean was an  editor for h is father’s com pany, Hugh 
C. MacLean Publishing, while his uncle was Jo h n  Bayne 
M acLean of the  M acL ean-H unter C orporation  (i.e. 
M aclean’s magazine).
23. M acLean to M acdonald, 3 November 1942, PANS, 
M acdonald Papers, MG2, F818 /56 .; AD MacLean, R.B. 
B ennett Prime M inister o f C anada, (Toronto: Excelsior 
P ub lish ing  C om pany Ltd, 1934).: H ouse of C om m ons 
D ebates, 9 Ju n e  1943, p.3483.
24. Milner, North A tlantic Run, p.19.
25. Talk w ith  LtCmdr Brown, 8 D ecem ber 1942, PANS, 
M acdonald Papers, MG2, F305.
26. Connolly to Audette, 20 Septem ber 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers. MG 32 C 71, Vol.2:16.
27. “F airm iles an d  F ou l.” Boating M agazine, Jan u a ry -  
F e b ru a ry  1943 , DHH, 9 4 /1 2 7 .  F or a co m p le te  
u n d ers tan d in g  of the  MacLean affair see the Connolly 
Papers Files 3-10, 3-11, an d  the M acdonald papers 
F818.
28. C om m ander G.L. Roome to Connolly, 19 February  
1943, NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3-8.
29. Milner, “Royal C anadian Navy Participation in the Battle 
of the A tlantic C risis of 1943,” in Ja m e s  A. Boutilier, 
ed., RCN in Retrospect, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982), 
p p .168-170.
30. Milner. “The Royal C anad ian  Navy an d  1943: A year 
b e s t fo rg o tten ? ,” in  P aul D ickson, ed., 1943: The 
B eg in n in g  o f  th e  en d , (W aterloo, ON: C a n a d ia n  
Committee for the History of the Second World War and 
th e  L a u r ie r  C e n tre  fo r M ilita ry  S tr a te g ic  a n d  
D isarm am ent S tudies, 1995), pp. 125-126.
31. D evelopm ent o f C anadian Naval Policy, 21 D ecem ber
1943, NAC, RG24, Vol. 11963. This report, and  o thers 
like it, have reported th a t while the RCN was transferred 
to RN control “[ t]he sh ip s never ac tua lly  proceeded to 
u n d ertak e  these  d u tie s  [UK to G ib ra ltar convoys] as 
the arrangem ents were superseded by others before they 
could come into effect.”
32. Z im m erm an, The Great Naval Battle o f O ttawa, p. 106: 
Roger Sarty, C anada a nd  the B attle  o f the Atlantic, 
(M ontreal: Art Global, 1998), p. 128.
33. S trange to Connolly, 13-15 Ju ly  1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3. S trange to EC R ussel, 9 
December 1968, DHH, EC Russel Papers, 91 /298 , Vol.4. 
Strange was born in British H onduras, and  later served 
in the RN until 1918. He immigrated to C anada in 1929.
34. W illiam  S tran g e , The C anad ian  N aval E quipm ent 
Crisis -  1943: A Personal Memoir, D ecem ber 1968, 
DHH, EC R ussel P apers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , Vol.4, 3. S trange to 
Connolly, 1 3 -1 5  Ju ly  1943, NAC, Connolly Papers, 
MG32 C71, Vol.3.
35. S trange to Connolly, 13-15 Ju ly  1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers. MG32 C71, Vol.3.
36. W illiam  S tran g e , The C anad ian  N aval E quipm ent 
Crisis -  1943: A Personal Memoir, D ecem ber 1968, 
DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 9 1 /298 , Vol.4, 4.
37. Piers to Rowland. C om m ents on the Operation and  
Performance o f HMC Ships, 1 Ju n e  1943, NAC, RG24, 
3997, NSS 1057-3-24, Vol.l. Royal Navy List, February
1944, DHH.
15
Mayne: Bypassing the Chain of Command: The Political Origins of the RCN’
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2000
38. I am  grateful to Dr. Marc Milner for drawing my attention 
to the fact th a t Adam’s observation echoed ones offered 
by the B ritish in 1941. For more inform ation, see North 
Atlantic Run.
39. Adams to Rowland, Equipm ent on RCN ships, 9 A ugust 
1943, DHH, Nelles Papers, Folder B, File 10.
40. R eport o f In terv iew  w ith  R ear A dm ira l K en n e th  F 
A dam s, DHH, BIOG A, 39; A dam s Memoir, DHH, BIOG 
A, 72-73. Nelles to M acdonald, 25 November 1943, 
NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3. Nelles received 
a  copy of Adam’s report from M acdonald after Connolly 
had  found it in a backlog of m essages at NSHQ. Nelles’s 
response , while em barrass ing  for the  CNS w as th a t  “I 
never knew  of th is report un til you drew  my a tten tio n  
to it th is  afternoon .”
41. S trange to EC R ussel, 9 D ecem ber 1968, DHH, EC 
R ussel Papers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , Vol.4. William S trange, The 
C anadian Naval E quipm ent Crisis -  1943: A Personal 
Memoir, December 1968, DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 91 / 
298, Vol.4, 2.
42. W illiam  S tran g e , The C anad ian  N aval E qu ipm en t 
Crisis -  1943: A Personal Memoir, D ecem ber 1968, 
DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , Vol.4, 6.
43. S trange to LCdr FO Gerity, 21 Septem ber 1943, DHH, 
EC R ussel Papers, 91 /298 .
44. W illiam S tran g e , The C anad ian  N aval E qu ipm en t 
Crisis -  1943: A  Personal Memoir, D ecem ber 1968, 
DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 9 1 /298 , Vol.4, 7.
45. Milner, North Atlantic Run, pp. 254-256. M ilner w as the 
f irs t to lin k  th e  tro u b le s  in th e  L iberal P a rty  to 
M acd o n a ld ’s d ilem m a w ith  th e  RCN’s eq u ip m en t 
problem s. Angus L. M acdonald Diary, 11 A ugust 1943, 
PANS, MG2, M acdonald Papers, F 391.
46. King Diary, 15 Septem ber 1943, Vol. 192:798.
47. W illiam S tran g e , The C anad ian  N aval E qu ipm en t 
Crisis -  1943: A Personal Memoir, D ecem ber 1968, 
DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , Vol.4, 7. Ironically, 
S trange not only rem ained in the RCN after the w ar bu t 
actually  becam e a p erm anen t force officer.
48. M acdonald to Nelles, 21 A ugust 1943, NAC, RG 24, 
3995; Nelles to M acdonald , M em o on the s ta te  o f  
equipm ent, PANS, M acdonald Papers, MG 2, F 2 7 6 /3 .
49. Nelles to Macdonald, Weekly Report, 25 February 1943, 
DHH, NS 1000-5-7, Vol.2.
50. “Fairm iles an d  Foul,” Boating M agazine, J a n u a ry  -  
February 1943, DHH, 94 /127 .
51. N otes on the charges m ade by MacLean in general, 
NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3-10.
52. A dm iralty to M urray, m essage 240128A, 24 A ugust 
1943, PANS, M acdonald Papers, MG 2, F 276 /24 .
53. U ntitled Poem, nd, NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, 
Vol.4:23.
54. S trange to Connolly, Thoughts on an  afternoon before 
C hristm as, nd , NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, 
Vol.4:23.
55. Connolly to Audette, 25 November 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C 71, Vol.2:1 7 .1 am  grateful to Mr. Robert 
Caldwell for draw ing my a tten tio n  to  th is le tte r and  in 
the tran sla tion  of its contents.
56. A udette to Connolly, 5 Decem ber 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:17.
57. Mitchell to Connolly, 29 December 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:18. For example, Mitchell told 
Connolly th a t "I saw  Louis A udette the o ther day for a 
m om ent only. He is now w ith u s  again after a long 
absence  an d  shall see m ore of him  a t ou r nex t po rt of 
call. It appears th a t we are now all set for ou t face lifting 
so I am  looking forward to a spo t of leave, w hen I shall 
visit all the  old h a u n ts .” The “face lifting” w ith w hich 
Mitchell referred, was the long awaited refit for h is ship.
58. O’B rien to Connolly, C hase m e Charlie, O ctober 1943, 
NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71. Vol.4:14.
59. A udette to Connolly, 22, 29 Septem ber 1943. NAC, 
Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:16.
60. S trange to Connolly, Confidential m em o, 21 Septem ber 
1943, NAC, Connolly Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.3; LCdr 
AM Lee to S trange, 4 O ctober 1943, NAC, Connolly 
P ap ers , MG32 C71, Vol.3.; S tran g e  to G erity , 21 
S eptem ber 1943, DHH, EC R ussel Papers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , 
Vol.4.
61. Strange to Adams, 21 Septem ber 1943, DHH. EC Russel 
Papers, 9 1 /2 9 8 , Vol.4.
62. Connolly to Mitchell, 16 November 1943, NAC. Connolly 
Papers, MG32 C71, Vol.2:17.
63. I am  grateful to Mr. Gerald O'Brien for this information.
64. Connolly to Audette. 25 November 1943, NAC, Connolly 
Papers, M G 32C71, Vol.2:17.
65. S trange to EC R ussel, 9 D ecem ber 1968, DHH, EC 
R ussel Papers, 9 1 /298 , Vol.4, 2.
R ichard Mayne received his M aster's degree 
from  WLU in  1999 w h ere  h e  w as the  
G raduate  Gold Medal w inner for Arts. He 
h a s  rec e n tly  p u b lish e d  a rtic le s  on the  
political h isto ry  of the  RCN in The Northern 
M ariner  a n d  T he A m e r ic a n  R e v ie w  o f  
C anadian Studies. C urren tly  a L ieu tenan t 
in  th e  n a v a l re se rv e , h e  w orks a t  th e  
D irec to ra te  of H isto ry  a n d  H eritage  a t  
National Defence H eadquarters.
16
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss3/2
